Introduction
In the paper "Interpretation as Abduction" (hereafter IA) Hobbs et al. (1992) 
present
•MN and elaborate the view that to interpret an utterance is to find the best explanation of __ . why it would be true. 1 We may call this the "Informational Perspective" on discourse 0 0) interpretation. The only thing to be explained is the information explicitly conveyed by the utterance, and the explanation does not involve any knowledge of the specific goals of '0 the speaker. Norvig and Wilensky (1990) raise the objection to this approach that what really needs to be explained is what the speaker was trying to accomplish with the utterance. We may call this the "Intentional Perspective" on discourse interpretation.
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The Intentional Persrective has been the canonical view in natural language processing since the middle 1970s. It originated with Power (1974) , Bruce (1975) , and Schmidt et al. (1978) , and is the view adopted in Cohen and Perrault (1979) , Allen and Perrault (1980) , Perrault and Allen (1980) , Hobbs and Evans (1980) , and many others since that time. The view taken in all of this work is that the speaker is executing a plan, the utterance is an action in that plan, and the job of the hearer is to discover the plan and the role that the utterance plays in the plan. This is an especially useful, indeed essential, perspective when the discourse is a dialogue in which most turns are a sentence or less in length and the participants' plans are being modified continuously by the interaction.
It is clear why the Intentional Perspective is the correct one when we look at things from the broadest possible point of view. An intelligent agent is embedded in the world and must, at each instant, understand the current situation. The agent does so by finding an explanation for what is perceived. Put differently, the agent must explain why the complete set of observables encountered constitutes a coherent situation. Other agents in the environment are viewed as intentional, that is, as planning mechanisms, and this means that the best explanation of their observable actions is most likely to be that they are steps in a coherent plan. Thus, making sense of an environment that includes other agents entails making sense of the other agents' actions in terms of what they are intended to achieve. When those actions are utterances, the utterances must be understood as actions in a plan the agents are trying to effect. That is, the speaker's plan must be recognized-the Intentional Perspective.
But there are several serious problems with the Intentional Perspective. First, the speaker's plan can play at best an indirect role in the interpretation process. The hearer has no direct access to it. It plays a causal role in some observable actions, in particular the utterance, which the hearer can then use, along with background knowledge, to form a belief about exactly what the plan is. Only this belief can play a direct role in interpretation. How is the hearer to arrive at this belief? How can the hearer go from utterance to intention, in those cases where there is no prior knowledge of the intention?
There is a further problem, that occurs especially in extended, one-speaker discourse, such as written text. There is a level of detail that is eventually reached at which the Intentional Perspective tells us little. It tells us that the proper interpretation of a compound nominal like "coin copier" means what the speaker intends it to mean, but it offers us virtually no assistance in determining what it really does mean. -Frequently what the speaker intends an utterance to mean is just what it would mean if spoken by almost anyone else in almost any other circumstance. We need a notion of interpretation that is independent of and goes beyond speaker's intention. It must, for example, give us access to plausible relations between coins and copiers.
A third problem with the Intentional Perspective is that there are many situations in which the speaker's plan is of little interest to the hearer. Someone in a group conversation may use a speaker's utterance solely as an excuse for a joke, or as a means of introducing a topic he or she wants to talk about. Very often two speakers in a discussion will try to understand each other's utterances in terms of their own frameworks, rather than attempt to acquire each other's framework. A medical patient, for example, may describe symptoms according to some narrative scheme, while the doctor tries to map the details into a diagnostic framework. A spy learning a crucial technical detail from the offhand remark of a low-level technician doesn't care about the speaker's intention in making the utterance, but only about how the information fits into his own prior global picture. A historian examining a document often adopts a similar stance. In all these cases, the hearer has his or her own set of interests, unrelated to the speaker's plan, and interpretation involves primarily relating the utterance to those interests.
In brief, the role of the speaker's intention is indirect, it is often uninformative, and it is frequently not very important. It cannot be the whole story. We need to have an intention-independent notion of interpretation.
Our first guess might be that we simply need the literal meaning of the utterance. But an utterance does not wear its meaning on its sleeve. Anaphora and ambiguities must be resolved. Metonymies and ellipsis must be expanded. Vague predications, including those conveyed by the mere adjacency of words or larger portions of text, must be made -specific. In short, the utterance must be interpreted. The notion of liLeral meaning gets us nowhere.
The canonical use of language is to present the facts about a situation. To understand a situation that we perceive we have to find an explanation for the observable facts in ,' that situation. Similarly, to understand a situation that is described to us we must find an ior an explanation for the facts we are told. But this is exactly the account of what an interpretation of an utterance is under the hIformational Perspective. The "informational interpretation" gives us an analogue of literal meaning that is adequate to the task. As shown in IA, interpreting an utterance by finding the best explanation for the information it conveys solves as a by-product the problems listed above--resolving anaphora and ambiguities, expanding metonymies and ellipsis, and determining specific meanings for vague predicates.
The informational interpretation is, to be sure, relative to an assumed background knowledge. Conversation is possible only between people who share some background knowledge, and interpretation is always with respect to some background knowledge that the hearer presumes to be shared. The explanation that constitutes the interpretaton has to come from somewhere. But conversation, and hence interpretation, is possible in the absence of information about the other's specific goals. We have conversations with strangers all the time.
The picture that emerges is this. Humans have constructed, in language, a tool that is primarily for conveying information about situations, relying on shared background knowledge. Like all tools, however, it can be put to uses other than its primary one. We can describe situations for purposes other than having the hearer know about them. The Informational Perspective on discourse interpretation tells us how to understand the situations described in a discourse. The Intentional Perspective tells us how to discover the uses to which this information is being put.
The Intentional Perspective on interpretation is certainly correct. To understand what's going on in a given communicative situation, we need to figure out why the speaker is making this particular utterance. But the Informational Perspective is a necessary component of this. We often need to understand what information the utterance would convey independent of the speaker's intentions. Another way to put it is this. We need to figure out why the speaker uttered a sequence of words conveying a particular content. This involves two parts, the informational aspect of figuring out what the particular content is, and the intentional aspect of figuring out why the speaker wished to convey it.
It should not be concluded from all of this that we first compute an informational interpretation and then as a subsequent process compute the speaker's intention. The two intimately influence each other. Sometimes, especially in the case of long written texts and monologues, the informational aspect completely overshadows considerations of intention. Other times, our knowledge of the speaker's intention completely masks out more conventional readings of an utterance. We consequently need a framework that will give us the conventional meaning, relative to a shared knowledge base, but will also allow us to override or to completely ignore this meaning when more is known about the speaker's aims. This paper is a preliminary effort to provide such a framework.
In IA, a framework is presented in which a number of discourse phenomena can be handled in a unified framework using abductive inference to construct the best explanation for the information conveyed explicitly in a text. The logical forms of the sentences in the text are proven abductively, and the solution to the discourse problems simply fall out. These phenomena are all basically informational in character. There is no essential appeal to speaker's intention. The phenomena are What is left out of that integrated framework was what Agar and Hobbs called "global coherence", namely, the recognition of the relation between parts of the discourse and the speaker's plan-the Intentional Perspective.
Recognizing the speaker's plan is also a problem of abduction. If we encode as axioms beliefs about what kinds of actions cause and enable what kinds of events and conditions, then in the presence of complete knowledge of the speaker's goals and beliefs, it is a matter of deduction to prove that the speaker believes a sequence or more complex arrangement of actions will achieve the goals. Unfortunately, we rarely have complete knowledge. We will almost always have to make assumptions. That is, abduction will be called for. We must prove abductively that the utterance contributes to the achievement of a goal of the speaker, within the context of a coherent plan. In the process we ought to find ourselves making many of the assumptions that hearers make when they are trying to "psych out" what the speaker is doing by means of his or her utterance. (Appelt and Pollack (1990) have also examined how weighted abduction of the sort presented in IA can be used for the plan ascription problem.) One might think that this requirement from the Intentional Perspective is an addition to the informational requirement of proving the logical form. But in this paper it is shown that the former subsumes the latter.
Most of the remainder of the paper focuses on a single example, a question which is answered in a way that indicates it was interpreted by relating it to the speaker's goals. The example is presented in Section 2. In Section 3 it is shown how the question can be interpreted strictly from an Informational Perspective. In Section 4 it is shown how this analysis is a central part of an analysis from the Intentional Perspective. In Section 5 it is shown how these two perspectives can be integrated into a single framework that also subsumes syntactic structure, compositional semantics, and local coherence. It is a framework, moreover, that allows each aspect of interpretation to exert influence on all the others.
This work is preliminary, and in Section 6 I sketch an account of how a complex, nonliteral type of utterance-tautology-can be approached in this framework.
The Example
The example to be analyzed is from a set of dialogues collected by Barbara Grosz (1977) between an expert and an apprentice engaged in fixing an air compressor. They are in different rooms, communicating by terminals. The apprentice A is doing the actual repairs, after receiving instructions from the expert B. At one point, the following exchange takes place:
According to a plausible analysis, B has interpreted A's utterance by relating it to A's overall plan. B knows that A wants to use the ratchet wrench. To use a ratchet wrench, you have to know where it is. To know where it is, you have to know what it is. B responds to A's question, not by answering it directly, but by answering to a higher goal in A's presumed overall plan, by telling A where it is.
B has therefore recognized the relationship between A's utterance and her overall plan. I will give two accounts of how this recognition could have taken place. The first account is informational. It is derived in the process of proving the logical form. The second account is intentional and subsumes the first. It is derived in the process of explaining, or proving abductively, the fact that A's utterance occurred.
The Informational Solution
For this solution we will need two axioms encoding the planning process:
or if an agent a has el as a goal and eo enables, or is a prerequisite for, el, then a has eo as a goal as well. or if an agent a has el as a goal and e 0 causes, or is one way to accomplish, el, then a may have e 0 as a goal as well. The etc, literal encodes the uncertainty as to whether e 0 will be chosen as the way to bring about el rather than some other action that causes el.
In terms of STRIPS operatiors (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971) , the first axiom says that prerequisites for an action must be satisfied, while the second axiom says essentially that to achieve a goal, an operator needs to be chosen and its body (eo) needs to be executed.
Next we need two domain axioms of a rather general character. That is, the speaker a has the goal e 5 of knowing the essential property e 6 of the ratchet wrench RW. Suppose also that in B's knowledge of the context is the following fact:
That is, the apprentice A has the goal E 2 of using the ratchet wrench RW. The proof of the logical form (5) follows from axioms (1) through (4) together with fact (6), as indicated in Figure 1 . Axiom (1) is used twice, first in conjunction with axiom (4) and then with axiom (3), to move up the planning tree. The apprentice wants to know what a ratchet wrench is because she wants to know where it is, and she wants to know where it is because she wants to use it. The proof then bottoms out in fact (6) .
To summarize, if we take the logical form of a question to be the expression of a desire to know something, then the proof of that logical form very often involves the recognition of the ultimate aims of the speaker in asking it.
The Intentional Solution
According to the Informational Perspective, it is the logical form of the utterance that needs to be explained, or proven abductively. We will now take a broader view in which it is the occurrence of an event in the world that has to be explained. It is not the content of the utterance that we have to explain, but rather the very fact that the utterance occurred. Frequently, the best explanation of an event is that it is an intentional action on the part of some agent, that is, it is an action in the service of some goal. This is especially true of utterances-they are generally intentional acts. Thus, we will be interpreting the utterance from an Intentional Perspective. We will ask why the speaker said what she did. We will see how this in turn encompasses the Informational Perspective.
We need several more axioms. First we need some axioms about speaking. That is, if e 7 is a's saying e8 to b, then that will cause the condition eg of b's knowing e 8 . Saying causes knowing. The next axiom is the converse of this. (8) (V ek, y, e)know'(ek, y, e) A etC2(ek, Y, 5 , then it may be (etc 4 ) that it was caused by the condition e 9 of b's knowing the fact e 8 that a has the goal es. Sometimes I do things because I know it will help you. In the example we will only need the axiom in this direction. Finally, we need an axiom schema that says that people do what they want to do.
That is, if a has as a goal some action e7 that a can perform, then it could be (etc5) that e7 will actually occur. This axiom, used in backward chaining, allows us to attribute intention to events. Now the problem we set for ourselves is not to prove the logical form of the utterance, but rather to explain, or prove abductively, the occurrence of an utterance with that particular content. We need to prove (12) (3e7,a,b,es,es,e 6 )Rezists(e7) A say'(e7,a,b,e 8 ) A goal'(es,a,es) A know'(es, a, e6) A wh'(e 6 , RW)
That is, we need to explain the existence in the real world of the event e7 of someone a saying to someone b the proposition es that a has the goal e 5 of knowing the essential property e 6 of a ratchet wrench. The proof of this is illustrated in Figure 2 . The boxes around the "et cetera" literals indicate that they have to be assumed. By axiom (11) we attribute intention to explain the occurrence of the utterance act e7; it's not like a sneeze. Using axiom (2), we hypothesize that this intention or goal is a subgoal of some other goal e 9 . Using axior. (8), we hypothesize that this other goal is b's knowing the content e8 of the utterance. A uttered the sentence so that B would know its content. Using axiom (2) again, we hypothesize that e 9 is a subgoal of some other goal elo, and using axiom (10) we hypothesize that el 0 is b's saying e 6 to a. A told B A's goal so that B would satisfy it. Using axiom (2) and (8) again, we hypothesize that elo is a subgoal of e 5 , which is a's knowing e6, the essential property of a ratchet wrench. A wants B to tell her what a ratchet wrench is so she will know it. The desired causal chain is this: A tells B she wants to know what a ratchet wrench is, so B will know that she wants to know what a ratchet wrench is, so B will tell her what a ratchet wrench is, so she will know what a ratchet wrench is. Causal chains are reversed in planning; if X causes Y, then our wanting Y causes us to want X. Hence, the causal chain is found by following the arrows in the diagram in the reverse direction.
At this point all that remains to prove is (3 a, e 5 ,e 6 )goal(a, es) A know'(e 5 , a, e 6 ) A wh'(e 6 , RW)
But this is exactly the logical form whose proof is illustrated in Figure 1 . We have reduced the problem of explaining the occurrence of an utterance to the problem of discovering its intention, and then reduced that to the problem of explaining the content of the utterance.
Interpetation from the Intentional Perspective includes as a subpart the interpretation of the utterance from the Informational Perspective.
Adding Syntax and Local Coherence
Now we incorporate syntax in a serious way into this example. (This section assumes familiarity with IA, Section 6.1.) Suppose our "grammar" contains the following axiom for the structure and interpretation of wh-questions: T'.-t is, if w, is a wh-word, Wv 2 is a copula, Wo 3 is a noun phrase referring to x, e 8 is the condition of the speaker a having the goal e 5 of knowing the essential property e5 of x, then the concatenation of w 1 , W2, and W3 is a sentence whose meaning is es. We also know the following facts: (14) wh-word("what"), copula("'s"), speaker(A)
That is, "what" is a wh-word, "'s" is a copula, and A is the speaker. For completeness, we will formalize our gimmick for bypassing the reference of "a ratchet wrench" by assuming that the knowledge base also contains the literal (15) np("a ratchet wrench", RW)
That is, the string "a ratchet wrench" is a noun phrase referring to the abstract object RW.
We will now add a wrinkle that has no significance for this particular example, but will give us a general account of interpretation encompassing not only global coherence, local pragmatics, syntax, and compositional semantics, but local coherence as well. In IA, Section 6.2, the tree-like structure of discourse is captured by the axiom ( saying that if w, is a segment whose assertion or topic is el, and w 2 is a segment asserting e 2 , and a coherence relation holds between the content of w, and the content of w 2 , that is, between el and e 2 , then the concatenation w, W2 is also a segment. The third argument e of CoherenceRelis the assertion or topic of the composed segment, as determined by the definition of the particular coherence relation. For this example, we will only need axiom (16). We now need one more axiom. The predicate say as used above has the content of the utterance as its final argument. We will not change this. Rather we will next introduce a predicate utter, which is like say but without the presumption of content or a hearer. Saying a meaningful segment of discourse is one example of uttering something. That is, if the string of words w is a discourse segment whose content is e! and there is a saying e 7 of es by a to b, then e7 is an uttering by a of the string of words w. Backchaining on this axiom will allow us to explain the uttering of strings of words as the production of meaningful discourse.
Let us now redo the example. The observable to be explained is now the occurrence of the utterance.
(19) (3 e 7 , a)Rexists(e 7 ) A utter'(er, a,"What's a ratchet wrench") That is, we need to explain the existence in the real world of the event e 7 of someone a uttering the string of words "What's a ratchet wrench". Figure 3 shows the first few steps of this proof. Using axiom (18), we hypothesize that the utterance is a saying of a contentful segment of discourse. Using axiom (16) we hypothesize that the segment of discourse is a single sentence. Using axiom (13), we unpack this into the syntactic structure and logical form of the sentence. Most of this can then be established by the facts in (14) and (15). What remains to be , ved at this point is (12) (3 e7, a, b, es, Observable to be Explained:
Rexists(e 7 ) A utter'(e 7 , a,"What's a ratchet wrench") Interpretation:
say'(e7, a, b, e 5 ) A Segment("What's a ratchet wrench", es)
1 (16) s("What's a ratchet wrench", es)
1 (13) wh-word( "What") np("a ratchet wrench", x) goal'(e 8 , a, es) wh'(e 6 , x) (14) copula("'s") speaker(a) know'(e 5 , a, e6) (14) np( "a ratchet wrench", RW) (15) The framework that has been presented here gives us a handle on some of the more complex things speakers do with their utterances. Let us see how we could deal with one example-tautology. Imagine two mothers, A and B, sitting in the playground and talking.
A. Your Johnny is certainly acting up today, isn't he? B: Boys will be boys.
From the Informational Perspective the interpretation of B's utterance might go something like this. The sentence expresses an implicative relation between two general propositionsboy(x) and boy(x). This implicative relation can be proved from the reflexive property of implication. Hence, the sentence tells us nothing new.
But from a global perspective this is not the best explanation, because it leaves too much unaccounted for. There is no explanation of why B would utter this or of how it is a response to A's utterance. We may have a good explanation for the content of the sentence, but we do not have a good explanation for the saying of a sentence with that content.
This forces us into an interpretation of the content that, while not optimal locally, contributes to a global interpretation that is optimal. In particular, we interpret the first occurrence of "boys" extensionally as a set that includes Johnny, and we interpret the second occurrence of "boys" intensionally, as entailing the property of always acting up. So the interpretation of the sentence becomes "Members of the class that Johnny belongs to always behave in this fashion." It thus defends B against the implied accusation that she is not a good mother.
that as the subgoal of another goal, and so on, until a link with the speaker's presumed goals is achieved. Many of these causal axioms, including axioms (7) and (8) , specify the relations between communicative acts and the speaker's and hearer's mental states, which as been the focus in research on planning speech acts.
All of these axioms are expressed in a uniform fashion and used by a single processabductive inference. Therefore, there is no problem of one "module" of the "discourse comprehension engine" communicating or interacting with another "module". Different branches of a proof graph can share variables. Thus, what is a good proof in one subgraph may not be part of a good proof of the whole. It is in this way that influence is communicated from one "module" to another. This is what happened in our analysis of the tautology.
We can certainly continue to think of, say, syntax and speaker's plan as different modules. But the distinction is entirely in our comments, not in our code.
